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CASES MOOT ON APPEAL: A LIMIT ON THE
JUDICIAL POWER
Since the judiciary is an equal branch in the federal and state govern-
mental systems, determination of the extent of judicial power becomes a
crucial problem in the effort to maintain the integrity and independence of
each of the branches of government. In the United States the courts them-
selves have largely determined the limits of judicial power through inter-
pretation of the constitutions and through other self-imposed limitations.'
While the exact scope of the power and its limits and application have
never been set forth precisely, a large body of law has grown up to which
every such question is referred.
Under the Federal Constitution, the courts of the United States can
render decisions only in "cases" and "controversies." 3 However, these
terms inherently are capable of many varying interpretations and have never
been defined authoritatively.4 Hence, any restriction of judicial power
created by construction of such terms may properly be termed self-imposed.
In determining what acts fall outside the scope of the judicial function,
courts have established the rule that they have no power to decide moot
cases.5 Since a court is deprived of jurisdiction when a case becomes moot,
1. HARRIS, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1940). See also,
VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF PowERs AND ITS PRESENT-DAY
SIGNIFICANCE (1953); Note, Judicial Self-Restraint in New Jersey, 8 RUTGERS L.
REv. 501 (1954).
These restrictions on the judicial power have been opposed, for varying reasons,
in Albertsworth, Advisory Functions in Federal Supreme Court, 23 GEo. L.J.
643 (1935); Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARV. L. REv. 913
(1934) ; HARRIS, op. cit. supra; Pound, Jurisprudence: Science or Superstition, 18
A.B.A.J. 312 (1932); VANDERBMT, op. cit. supra.
2. HARRIS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 7-9.
3. U.S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356
(1911); Stearns v. Wood, 236 U.S. 75, 78 (1915): "The province of courts is to
decide real controversies, not to discuss abstract propositions."
4. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895). "Judicial power can be exercised only
as to matters that were the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster, and
only if they arise in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constitute 'Cases' or
'Controversies.' Even as to questions that were the staple of judicial business, it is
not for the courts to pass upon them unless they are indispensably involved in a
conventional litigation. . . ." Frankfurter, J., concurring in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (italics added). The terms were
probably not intended to set forth jurisdictional limits rigidly.
5. MICHAEL, THE ELE.MENTS OF LEGAL CoNTROvERSY 94-117 (1948); Mills v.
Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895); Southern Pac. Term. Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514
(1911); Tregea v. Modesto Irrig. Dist., 164 U.S. 179 (1896); In re Workmen's
Comp. Fund, 224 N.Y. 13, 119 N.E. 1027 (1918). However, the state courts have
established a "public interest" exception to this general rule. See text at notes
105-36 infra.
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the fact of mootness can be raised at any time during the judicial pro-
ceeding and, once proved, will prevent decision of the case on the merits.6
The most important and basic reason for judicial denial of the power
to decide moot cases is one which lies at the very heart of common-law
jurisprudence. Our basic legal philosophy is premised on the theory that
the best way to achieve a wise resolution of disputed legal matters is to
allow each party his day in court to present his views, with opportunity
to challenge and rebut those of his opponent. This adversary system de-
pends upon self-interest as the motive best suited to bring all pertinent
facts, policies and legal issues before the court.7 When one party to an
action has nothing to gain from a decision in his favor, many of the ad-
vantages of the adversary system are likely to be lost, since a disinterested
person probably will not exert the same effort to bring all considerations
before the court as one about to be affected adversely by an unfavorable
decision. Familiar with adversary proceedings and often quite dependent
upon counsel for facts, argument and authority, courts are more likely to
be led into error in a non-adversary situation, especially one which in form
resembles customary proceedings.8 When such error may be used as the
basis for future decisions, the harm becomes a serious one and the re-
quirement of adverse interests at the bar assumes great importance. In
addition, parties who may never get into court may rely upon the decision
and change their positions to their detriment.
6. United States v. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624, 640 (1948); Swift & Co. v.
Hocking Valley Ry., 243 U.S. 281 (1917); Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541,
546 (2d Cir. 1942). In the Supreme Court, facts showing mootness may be brought
out by judicial notice, by an anicus curiae, or by either party in a brief, motion to
dismiss, brief opposing grant of certiorari, memorandum, oral argument, or subse-
quent memorandum. STERN & GROSSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTicE 338-49 (1950).
7. See Bischoff, Status to Challenge Constitutionality in SuPpmm CoURT AND
SuRam-E LAW 26 et seq. (Cahn ed. 1954) ; FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE Su-
PREmE COURT 79-80, 84-88 (1951).
8. This theory can be applied on only a very general basis. In given instances,
a decision in a non-adversary situation may be of higher quality than one in an
adversary situation. It is difficult to comprehend why one should feel assured of
the soundness of an opinion as to an important issue in cases involving small amounts
of money, whereas it is considered too dangerous to decide the same issue in a
moot suit. But the need for convenience requires that a line be drawn and it has
been deemed best to draw that line where all self-interest of a party is lacking.
However, the proposition that an opinion in a moot case would have to be disre-
garded because of the dangers surrounding its formaiion should not be accepted as
valid in every instance. Many of the opinions in moot cases decided under the
public interest exception, see text following note 105 infra, appear to be thoroughly re-
searched and well-reasoned. See, e.g., Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Ore. 283, 251 P.2d
87, rehearing denied, 197 Ore. 331, 253 P.2d 289 (1953) (discussing habeas corpus),
which was described in a concurring opinion as "a splendid and valuable contribution
to the law. . . ." Id. at 351, 253 P.2d at 298.
In addition, the courts do realize that dangers of an unwise decision exist even
where there is an actual controversy between the parties. An example of this is the
United States Supreme Court's reluctance to decide constitutional issues except
where absolutely necessary to the decision of the case. For a list of these restrictions
on deciding constitutional questions, see the concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936). The mootness doctrine is a
convenient one for implementing the characteristic avoidance of constitutional ques-
tions. See St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943).
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Moot cases have often been equated to advisory opinions because of the
likelihood in each that all arguments will not be fully presented.9 Prin-
cipally because of this deficiency, advisory opinions have never been given
widespread acceptance in this country.10 It is conceded that advisory opin-
ions may have great utility, especially during periods in which much ex-
perimental legislation is being enacted, in alleviating the uncertainty, doubt
and confusion which abound when the constitutionality of such statutes is
undecided." However, there is a danger that advisory opinions will create
undesirable precedents because the "impact of actuality" is wanting,'2 and
because generally only one side is argued before the court. 13 When the
constitutionality of a statute is in issue, it is thought that the court should
be faced with a record of the statute's actual operation, compiled in an
adversary proceeding with all the safeguards of rules of evidence and cross-
examination, rather than with the bare words of the statute without the
gloss of administrative or executive interpretation and enforcement.' 4
However, moot cases do not present all the dangers of advisory opinions.
The "impact of actuality" may well be lacking if the court knows that its
decree cannot affect the rights of the parties. But there is a record to which
the court may look for facts; there is probably as much experience under
the statute as might be had in a case which is not moot; and there are
advocates before the court who are prepared to argue the issues.35 Al-
though some comparison may be made between moot cases and advisory
opinions, the desirability of rendering decision in moot cases cannot be
resolved merely by such a comparison.
Generally speaking, a case is moot when a party has no legal interest
in the outcome.' 6 Such lack of interest may result from various causes.
9. See, e.g., Donato v. Board of Barber Examiners, 56 Cal. App.2d 916, 133
P.2d 490 (1943).
10. Seven states render such opinions under constitutional provisions; three have
statutory authorization, HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND Tm FEDERAL
SYSTM 77-81 (1953). See also Clovis & Updegraff, Advisory Opinions, 13 IowA
L. REV. 188, 194-96 (1928).
11. See generally, Clovis & Updegraff, supra note 10; ELLINGvWOOD, DEPART-
MENTAL COOPERATION IN STATE GOVERNMENTS (1918) ; Field, The Advisory Opinion-
An Analysis, 24 IND. L.J. 203 (1949); Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and
International Courts, 37 HARv. L. REV. 970 (1924); Note, Why Not Advisory
Opinions for Illinois?, 31 CHI-KENT REV. 141 (1953); Comment, The Ad-
visory Opinion. and the United States Supreme Court, 5 FORD. L. REv. 94 (1936).
12. Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARv. L. REv. 1002, 1006
(1924). See also, Aumann, The Supreme Court and the Advisory Opinion, 4 OHIO
ST. L.J. 21 (1937); Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions in 1 ENCYc. Soc. ScI. 475
(1937).
13. For a proposal that the attorney-general of the jurisdiction be required to
submit briefs on both sides of the question, see Clovis & Updegraff, supra note 10,
at 195.
14. Davison, The Constitutionality and Utility of Advisory Opinions, 2 U. OF
TORONTO L.J. 254, 270 (1938) ; FREUND, op. cit. supra note 7, at 109-10. Although
advisory opinions are not, in theory, binding upon the court in later cases, BORCHARD,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 52 (1934), they have been described as "ghosts that slay."
Frankfurter, supra note 12, at 1008.
15. See FREUND, Op. cit. supra note 7, at 84-85.
16. See generally, BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 14, at 26-57; Diamond, Federal
Jurisdiction to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. OF PA. L. REv. 125 (1946) ; ROBERTSO= &
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In most cases, since the plaintiff is the one who seeks to protect a legal
right, he is the party whose interest will be lacking. Often, when a plain-
tiff is seeking mandatory or injunctive relief to prevent an impending
harm, the inevitable delays of judicial administration will make the re-
quested decree ineffectual to secure to the plaintiff that which he sought.l17
For obvious reasons, courts prefer not to enter decrees which will have no
effect on the present status of the parties, and will dismiss such cases in
order to devote their time to the decision of live controversies, which do
give relief to those whose rights have been violated.'8 With the crowded
condition of most dockets, economy of judicial endeavor becomes a second
important reason for the mootness doctrine.
Mootness must be distinguished from abatement, which has been de-
fined as the suspension or termination of all proceedings in a suit from
the want of proper parties capable of proceeding therein.
19 In a moot case
only the legal interest of a party is lacking.
TYPES OF MOOT CASES
In some frequently recurring situations, mootness doctrines are easily
applied.
Collusive and Fictitious Actions.-In a collusive suit, the appearance of
an adversary contest is maintained for the purpose of securing a judgment
desired by both parties; thus the proceeding presents a virtual fraud on
the court. In Lord v. Veazie2 o both plaintiff and defendant desired the
same result, which would have foreclosed the rights of one not a party
KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 493-536
(Wolfson & Kurland ed. 1951) ; STERN & GRoSSMAN, op. Cit. supra note 6, at 338-49;
Note, 22 IND. L.J. 235 (1947); Note, 53 H.ARv. L. REv. 628 (1940); Note, 34
HARv. L. REv. 416 (1921).
Compare HAmuus, op. cit. supra note 1, at 23: such doctrines "are no more than
trees behind which judges hide when they wish either to throw stones at Congress
or the President or to escape from those who are urging them to do so ... "
17. E.g., Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474 (1939); Dunn v. Dunn, 96 Ind. App.
620, 185 N.E. 334 (1933) ; Bassett v. Armstrong, 309 Pa. 296, 163 Atl. 525 (1933) ;
cf. Natural Milk Producers v. City and County of San Francisco, 317 U.S. 423
(1943); International Union v. Hoisting & Portable Engineers, 231 Ind. 634, 110
N.E.2d 332 (1953). However, courts often render judgments which cannot be
satisfied. BORcHARD, op. cit. supra note 14, at 8.
18. Van DeVegt v. Board of Comm'rs of Larimer County, 98 Colo. 161, 177,
55 P.2d 703, 710 (1936) (dissenting opinion); In re Norton, 158 N.Y. 130, 52
N.E. 723 (1899).
19. Bouvmn, LAw DicrioNARY 6 (Thira rev. 1914). See, e.g., Snyder v. Buck,
340 U.S. 15 (1950) (no substitution of official party after resignation), discussed
thoroughly in Note, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 443 (1952) ; Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S.
189, 883 (1949) (defendant fled jurisdiction), discussed in 48 MIcH. L. REv. 111
(1949). Writs of habeas corpus will be dismissed when it appears that the petitioner
is no longer in the custody of the defendant, who is thus not a proper party. United
States ex rel. Innes v. Crystal, 319 U.S. 755 (1943); Zimmerman v. Walker, 319
U.S. 744 (1943). But see Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304-05 (1944). See also
United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 520 (1943) (death of defendant in criminal
case abates the cause); Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 346 (1944); cf.
Howard v. Wilbur, 166 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1948).
20. 8 How. 251 (U.S. 1850). See also French v. Jeffries, 149 F.2d 555 (7th
Cir. 1945); Bryan v. Kales, 3 Ariz. 423, 31 Pac. 517 (1892) (plaintiff suing
himself).
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to the action. On motion of the third party, the Supreme Court dismissed
the suit as collusive.
Not quite as strong a case is that presented by the framed test case,
which lacks the element of common desire for one outcome; but here too,
the courts will refuse to hear and decide the legal issues involved. This
situation has arisen, for example, where a suit to test the validity of an act
of Congress was authorized by the act, and an appropriation was made to
cover the attorneys' fees necessary for the suit.2  Cases where one
party has acquired control over both sides of the action,22 or where the de-
fendant has subsidized the suit through payment of the plaintiff's attorney's
fees,23 also will not be decided. However, one case held that, although
the plaintiff had written the defendant that any judgment obtained would
not be executed against the defendant but would be used merely to establish
the defendant's negligence to aid in collecting insurance, the case was not
moot. There was no binding assurance that the plaintiff would not execute,
principally because he might not be permitted to rely on the judgment in
his subsequent suit against the insurance company.24 The doctrine of
mootness does not preclude the decision of those test cases which are
based on actual facts and in which control or the strong possibility of control
by one party is absent, even though the parties may agree to certain steps
which merely expedite the decision without influencing the result.
SettlemenL-When the parties settle a controversy, the courts will
dismiss the appeal upon motion of either.25  Economy of judicial endeavor
requires dismissal here, for even the parties ordinarily have no interest in
21. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) (dismissed because the
parties had no adverse interests) ; cf. In re Workmen's Comp. Fund, 224 N.Y. 13,
119 N.E. 1027 (1918).
In Norton v. Vesta Coal Co., 291 U.S. 641 (1934), the Government, after having
applied for and having been granted certiorari on the ground that there was a
conflict among the circuits, then adopted the position that the decision adverse to the
Government in the lower court was correct. Certiorari was dimissed; no substantial
controversy existed.
22. East Tennessee, Va. & Ga. R.R. v. Southern Tel. Co., 125 U.S. 695 (1888).
See also United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) ; cf. Fukunaga v. Fujino,
38 Hawaii 556 (1950).
23. Cf. San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885). But cf.
City and County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal.2d 685, 140 BP2d 666 (1943)
(attorney's fees for both plaintiff and defendant, comptroller of plaintiff, paid from
public funds; held: since defendant was merely performing his duty to prevent
improper expenditures and a real controversy existed, not collusive).
See Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Jervis, [1944] W.N. 91; Mathews
v. Coca-Cola Co. of Canada, Ltd., [1944] Can. Sup. Ct. 385; both cases discussed
in 22 CAN. B. Rxv. 547 (1944). See also Halligan v. Davis, 64 Ir. L.T.R. 117,
[1930] I.R. 237.
24. Reynolds v. Van Culin, 36 Hawaii 556, 560-63 (1943).
25. Stewart v. Southern Ry., 315 U.S. 283, 784 (1942) (on rehearing);
Danciger Oil & Refining Co. v. Smith, 290 U.S. 599 (1933) (stipulation); Dakota
County v. Glidden, 113 U.S. 222 (1885); Willis v. Buchman, 240 Ala. 386, 199
So. 892 (1940); State ex rel. Robinson v. Boniecki, 223 Ind. 416, 61 N.E.2d 176
(1945).
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the outcome of the suit.26  However, in one case, the United States Su-
preme Court dismissed the appeal in a bitterly contested rate controversy,
on the ground that the case had been settled when the competing carriers
accepted an ICC compromise rate designed to be effective only until a court
decision could be obtained.27  It would seem that the Court in this case
was somewhat overzealous in applying the restrictive rule.
Preliminary Orders.-In some cases, while the appeal from a pre-
liminary court order is pending, the main issue in the case will be decided
or settled, or may be before the same court in a separate appeal. Then,
the first appeal is moot.
28
Multiple Legal Theories.-Where more than one legal basis for a cause
of action or defense is in issue, and one is decided which is determinative
of the case, the second is moot and need not and will not be decided.2 9 For
example, where the plaintiff opposed the registration of the defendant's
trademark on the ground that a possibility of confusion existed and regis-
tration was denied on the ground that the trademark was not registerable,
the issue of confusion was held to be moot; the plaintiff had already ob-
tained that which he sought in bringing the action8 0 If a lower court rules
on the extraneous matter, it will not be considered on appeal, although the
decree may be reformed to eliminate the unnecessary portion.8 '
Lapse of Time.-Mere lapse of time will sometimes cause a case to be-
come moot. This is especially true in suits seeking mandatory or injunctive
26. Even though the court costs have not been settled, this is not sufficient
interest in the outcome to enable the court to decide the case. See cases cited note
39 infra. Cf. International Union of Operating Engineers v. Hoisting & Portable
Engineers Union, 231 Ind. 634, 110 N.E.2d 332 (1953).
27. United States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U.S. 812 (1929). For the facts, see
Arnold, supra note 1, at 915.
28. Royal Cadillac Service, Inc. v. United States, 317 U.S. 595 (1942) (effect
of application on interim operation, application denied); Sterling v. Constantin, 287
U.S. 378, 386 (1932) (appeal from grant of temporary injunction, appeal from
final decree before the court); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of
Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 224 (1932) (same); Chicago & V. R.R. v. Fosdick,
106 U.S. 47, 84 (1882) (appeal from execution of decree, decree reversed); People
v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 80 N.E.2d 736 (1949) (order for psychological examination,
defendant convicted of crime); New Orleans v. Vinci, 153 La. 528, 96 So. 110
(1923) ; Humarm v. Rivera, 272 App. Div. 352, 71 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1st Dep't 1947) (de-
nial of motion for new trial, conviction reversed) ; Fitzgerald v. State, 188 P.2d 412
(Okla. Crim. App. 1947) (appeal of conviction, new trial granted); Huffman v.
Alexander, 197 Ore. 283, 251 P.2d 87 (1952), rehearing denied, 197 Ore. 331, 253
P.2d 289 (1953) (habeas corpus, conviction reversed) ; Shinn v. Stemmler, 159 Pa.
Super. 129, 47 A.2d 294 (1946) (effect of administrative order pending appeal, order
affirmed). Cf. Cheong Ah Moy v. United States, 113 U.S. 216 (1885) (habeas
corpus, prisoner deported). See Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 181 (1906). In
United States ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States Tariff
Comm'r, 274 U.S. 106 (1927), the Court refused to review the fairness of an ad-
ministrative hearing held for the purpose of making a recommendation to the
President on tariff rates when it appeared that the President had acted on the
recommendation and had set new rates, a "political," non-reviewable act.
29. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 333 (1933); Lewis v. United States,
216 U.S. 611 (1910) ; cf. Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216 (1923).
30. Frankfort Distilleries v. Dextora Co., 103 F.2d 924 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
31. Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 219 (1939). See
cases cited note 136 infra.
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relief, as where the plaintiff sought specific performance of a covenant not
to compete for one year, and the year had expired by the time the appeal
was heard.32  Recently, in Doremus v. Board of Education38 the Supreme
Court held that a parent who complained that his child was being subjected
to an unconstitutional requirement of Bible reading had a moot case when
the child graduated. A case chosen to test the constitutionality of the Child
Labor Act was held to be moot when it was shown that the child had
reached an age no longer subject to the provisions of the Act.3 4 Thus, it
is apparent that often in injunction cases the person who wins in the lower
court has won the case, for all appeal will be cut off by the doctrine of moot-
ness if the action sought to be restrained was a single act or a series of acts
taking but a short time, or if the injunction was needed for only a short
time.35 There is no way in these cases to preserve the right of appeal, for
to maintain the status quo is, in effect, to grant the injunction; however,
mitigating doctrines have been developed which are discussed below.3 6
In other recurrent situations, the application of mootness doctrines
presents more difficult problems.
Other Relief Possible.-In some instances, although the principal re-
lief sought has become unobtainable because of mootness, the plaintiff may
have included a count which has not been affected and which remains vital,
or may be able to amend his complaint to seek relief which it still is possible
to grant, generally money damages.3 7 Possibly the defendant may be liable
for penalties or reparations.3 8 Costs incurred in the prosecution of the case
32. E.g., Standard Dairies v. McMonagle, 139 Pa. Super. 267, 11 A2d 535
(1939). Accord, Stern v. Stern, 327 Mich. 531, 42 N.W.2d 737 (1950) (court order
sought to enable parent to have child's visit in August, 1949, case decided May,
1950). See Poole v. Giles, 248 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1952) (dissenting opinion), for
discussion of this problem.
33. 342 U.S. 429, 423-33 (1952).
34. Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13, 15-16 (1922).
35. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 205 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1953); Stern
v. Stem, 327 Mich. 531, 42 N.W.2d 737 (1950).
36. These doctrines are discussed herein as continuing controversies (text at
notes 73-104 iifra) and public interest (text at notes 105-36 infra).
37. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 353 (1922)
(damages capable of partial assessment); Papaliolios v. Durning, 175 F.2d 73
(2d Cir. 1949) (complaint treated as amended); Dakota Coal Co. v. Fraser, 267
Fed. 130 (8th Cir. 1920) (case remanded with leave to amend) ; Martin v. American
Potash & Chemical Corp., 92 A.2d 295 (Del. 1952). In Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256
U.S. 359 (1921), and State ex rel. Robinson v. Boniecki, 223 Ind. 416, 61 N.E.2d
176 (1945), probably the plaintiff could also have pursued an action for damages
for unlawful possession of the real estate whose possession was in issue, although the
issue was not raised in either case.
38. Southern Pacific Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 433 (1911) (reparations) ; Oklahoma
City v. Sanders, 94 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1938) (penalties); Moore v. Smith, 160
Kan. 167, 160 P.2d 675 (1945) (damages). But cf. Kiker v. City of Wewoka,
205 Okla. 90, 235 P.2d 710 (1951) (public interest exception, see text at notes
105-36 infra, does not apply where plaintiff, in moot suit for injunction, may seek
damages in another action). Multiplicity of actions may be avoided by treating the
complaint as amended on appeal, as in Papaliolios v. Durning, 175 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
1949).
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are generally held not sufficient to enable the court to retain jurisdiction
and decide the case.3 9
Obviously, it frequently will be possible to present the argument that
the plaintiff might be entitled to some other relief. Judicial discretion must
be exercised to limit the effectiveness of this argument to the unusual case,
and appeals have been dismissed where the additional relief sought was
found to be merely ancillary to the relief now impossible to grant.40 By
including a count for damages in his original complaint, the plaintiff may
be able to avoid the ancillary doctrine, which seems to have been applied
only in cases in which the alternative relief was sought merely as an after-
thought after the case had become moot. Applicable procedural rules must,
of course, be consulted to determine the propriety of such joinder of legal
and equitable relief.
Satisfaction of Criminal Sentences-Under the majority rule, one who
has paid his fine or served his full prison term cannot prosecute an appeal
of the judgment of his conviction.41 Many of these courts hold that de-
fendants in these situations have waived the right to appeal, which there-
fore makes a subsequent appeal moot.42 Since the waiver argument is
essentially a mere legal conclusion, the problem is better expressed as a
judicial determination of what minimum interest in the outcome of the
appeal must remain in the defendant to prevent the case from becoming
39. E.g., Chaitlen v. Kaspar Am. State Bank, 372 Ill. 83, 22 N.E2d 673 (1939);
In re Kaeppler, 7 N.D. 307, 75 N.W. 253 (1898). Contra: State ex rel. Strike v.
Racine, 201 Wis. 435, 230 N.W. 70 (1930); cf. Piper v. Hawley, 179 Cal. 10, 175
Pac. 417 (1918) (costs and damages).
In Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359 (1921), the Court awarded costs to the
defendant, since the plaintiff was responsible for the case being moot.
40. Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U.S. 528, 532 (1926) ; Lewis Pub. Co. v. Wyman,
228 U.S. 610 (1913); cf. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 205 F.2d 944 (9th
Cir. 1953).
41. E.g., St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943) ; Bergdoll v. United
States, 279 Fed. 404 (3d Cir. 1922).
See Rogers, Payment of Fine in Criminal Case as Affecting Right to Review
Conviction, 35 LAw NoTES 31 (1931) ; Note, Criminal Law: Recovery of Fines Paid
for Violations of a Statute Subsequently Declared Unconstitutional, 2 Oa.. L.
REv. 351 (1949); Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 786 (1950); Annot., 74 A.L.R. 638
(1931); Annot., 18 A.L.R. 867 (1922).
In most instances, criminal appeals which become moot on this ground are for
minor crimes, since substantial sentences will not have been completely served by the
time the appeal is heard. However, in Director of Prisons v. Court of First
Instance of Cavite, 239 U.S. 633 (1915), the death sentence was inflicted before
the appeal was heard. The appeal was dismissed as moot.
42. State v. Westfall and Mathews, 37 Iowa 575 (1873) ; State v. Conkling, 54
Kan. 108, 37 Pac. 992 (1894); People v. Melovicz, 221 Mich. 620, 192 N.W. 562
(1923); Washington v. Cleland, 49 Ore. 12, 88 Pac. 305 (1907); Commonwealth
v. Gipner, 118 Pa. 379, 12 Atl. 306 (1888). Compare People v. Pyrros, 323 Mich.
329, 35 N.W.2d 281 (1948), with 1943-44 REP. OF ATr'y GEN. OF MIcH. 528.
In St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943), the Court indicated that
St. Pierre's failure to apply for supersedeas pending the outcome of his appeal was
an important factor in the decision.
"These decisions, it seems to us, lose sight of, or purposely ignore, that damaging
effect of such a judgment which everybody knows reaches far beyond its satisfaction
by payment of a fine or serving a term of imprisonment." State v. Winthrop, 148
Wash. 526, 534, 269 Pac. 793, 797 (1928). See text at note 58 and note 58 infra.
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moot.43 At present, a minority of jurisdictions have considered such ap-
peals on the merits.
A factor frequently stressed in the majority decisions is that the judg-
ment of the court could not restore to the defendant that which he lost
through his allegedly improper conviction." Obviously, the court cannot
give back the tirn spent in jail, and in many states a fine paid under a
mistake cannot be recovered 4 Conversely, where, by constitutional pro-
vision, the governor has the power to remit fines and forfeitures for offenses
against the state, it has been held that payment of a fine did not deprive the
defendant of his right to appeal.46 Payment of a fine does not necessarily
indicate real acquiescence in the judgment 47  and, where the fine has been
paid under protest 48 or by a third person,49 such payment is not even
evidence of acquiescence by the defendant. Except for judicial unwilling-
ness to issue an order which cannot undo the material harm done to the
wrongfully-convicted appellant, 50 there seems to be no reason why the in-
ability to recover amounts paid by mistake should be controlling.3 ' Par-
ticularly in criminal cases, the defendant 2 has a great interest in clearing
his name of the stigma of a conviction.58 A small segment of the minority
decisions have recognized this interest as the sole interest necessary to
43. "There is no basis in fact for the contention that he waives his appeal, for
the thing done bears no inconsistent relation to the thing to be done, so there is not
factually an election.' People v. Channess, 109 Cal. App. 778, 780, 288 Pac. 20, 21
(App. Dep't 1930). See Village of Avon v. Popa, 121 N.E. 2d 254 (Ohio Ct. App.
1953).
44. "We agree . . . that a 'good name is better than riches.' Its loss or im-
pairment is a melancholy disaster to anyone who values it. But we do not perceive
how we can revive a dead judgment for the purpose of quieting title to a good
reputation." State v. Cohen, 45 Nev. 266, 201 Pac. 1027 (1921).
45. E.g., Ferguson v. Butler County, 297 Mo. 20, 247 S.W. 795 (1923); State
v. Westfall and Mathews, 37 Iowa 575 (1873).
46. Duncan v. State, 190 Md. 486, 58 A.2d 906 (1948) ; cf. Bower v. State, 135
N.J.L. 564, 53 A.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (recovery of fine permitted by judicial
decision).
47. Johnson v. State, 172 Ala. 424, 55 So. 226 (1911) ; Commonwealth v. Fleckner,
167 Mass. 13, 44 N.E. 1053 (1896). For an example of acquiescence, see State v.
People's Ice Co., 127 Minn. 252, 149 N.W. 286 (1914).
48. Papaliolios v. Durning, 175 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1949).
49. Metcalf v. Drew, 75 Cal. App.2d 711, 171 P2d 488 (1946); Ishpeming v.
Maroney, 49 Mich. 226 (1882) (alternative holding). But cf. Eutsler v. Common-
wealth, 154 Ky. 35, 156 S.W. 855 (1913) (fine paid by defendant's wife).
50. See text following note 17 supra.
51. Johnson v. State, 172 Ala. 424, 55 So. 226 (1911). The inability to recover
fines prevents analogy to civil cases, in which it is uniformly held that payment
of a judgment does not necessarily constitute waiver of the right to appeal, since,
in such cases, the amount paid may be recovered from the judgment holder if the
appeal is successful. Morfessis v. Marvins Credit, Inc., 77 A.2d 178 (D.C. Mun.
Ct. App. 1950).
52. ". . . [I]t seems to us that the next-of-kin of a convicted person who dies
pending an appeal have an interest in clearing his good name, which Congress
might well believe would justify a change in the law." United States v. Mook,
125 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1942). Cf. Rose v. Daily Mirror, 284 N.Y. 335, 31 N.E.2d
182 (1940).
53. State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526, 269 Pac. 793 (1928); accord, Matter
of Lincoln, 102 Cal. App. 733, 283 Pac. 965 (1929) ; People v. Marks, 64 Misc. 679,
120 N.Y.S. 1106 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1909).
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allow an appeal. 4  Most of the minority courts, however, require more
than just an interest in reputation.s5 In an early New York case, the court
allowed an appeal partly because the defendant's conviction of criminal libel,
based on a book he had published, would decrease the profits from the sale
of the book.5 6 If the defendant is threatened with deportation stemming
from conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, it has been held that
an appeal from his conviction may be heard, even though his sentence has
been served.57
Some states, by constitutional provision or by statute, withdraw cer-
tain civil rights, most usually the right to vote or hold office, from per-
sons convicted of certain crimes.58 Also, one's standing to pursue certain
professions may be impaired by a criminal conviction.59 In such states, a
very real harm from the allegedly improper conviction may continue long
after the sentence has been satisfied, and therefore the defendant's appeal
should be heard. 0 Many jurisdictions have criminal registration statutes
or ordinances 0 ' and habitual criminal statutes which would impose an
additional burden.6 2 In the courts which require more than an interest in
reputation in order to hear an appeal,' the above multifarious legal inter-
ests and loss of rights of a convicted person should provide the added
54. California has recognized this interest often: In re Byrnes, 26 Cal.2d 824, 161
P.2d 376 (1945); People v. Becker, 108 Cal. App.2d 764, 239 P.2d 898 (1952)
(recognizing the trend in that state) ; People v. Chamness, 109 Cal. App. 778, 288
Pac. 20 (App. Dep't 1930). See also People v. Marks, 64 Misc. 679, 120 N.Y.S.
1106 (Ct Gen. Sess. 1909); Village of Avon v. Popa, 121 N.E.2d 254 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1953) ; Roby v. State, 96 Wis. 667, 71 N.W. 1046 (1897).
55. See cases cited in note 41 supra.
56. Barthelemy v. People, 2 Hill 248, 256 (N.Y. 1842).
57. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946) ; State ex rel. Lopez v. Killi-
grew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808 (1931). But cf. McCarthy v. Wayne County
Circuit Judge, 294 Mich. 368, 293 N.W. 683 (1940) (policeman indefinitely suspended
as a result of contempt of court conviction, but evidence of suspension not in record).
58. E.g., Mo. CoNsT. Art. VIII, § 2; Mo. REv. STAT. § 111.060 (1949); FLA.
CONsT. Art. 6, § 4. See Crawford, Discretionary Relief from Consequences of Criminal
Convictions in Missouri, 28 WA H. U.L.Q. 74, 77-78 (1943) ; Gathings, Loss of Citizen-
ship and Civil Rights for Conviction of Crime, 43 .A. POL Sci. Rxv. 1228 (1949) ;
Holtzoff, Loss of Civil Rights by Conviction of Crime, 6 FED. PROBATION 18 (1942) ;
Comment, 26 So. CALIF. L. REv. 425 (1953). However, only the most serious crimes
are punished in this manner, and most severe criminal sentences will not be satisfied
before an appeal can be heard.
59. Note, 59 YALE L.J. 786 (1950).
60. In such a case, the defendant "has a substantial stake in the judgment of
conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him.' Fiswick
v. United Sfates, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946) ; State v. Smiley, 98 Mo. 605, 12 S.W. 247
(1889).
61. Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control Over Potential
Recidivists, 103 U. OF PA. L. REv. 60, 65 (1954). Some of these ordinances ap-
parently apply even to minor crimes, id. at 67.
62. State v. Jacobson, 348 Mo. 258, 152 S.W.2d 1061 (1941). Defendant accepted
a pardon proffered because the Governor was convinced of his innocence. Even
though this type of pardon carries no imputation of guilt, see Crawford, mpra
note 58, at 77-78, it was held that sufficient controversy still existed to prevent the
appeal from being moot. But cf. State v. Stout, 258 Pac. 1054 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1927), 41 HARv. L. REv. 534 (1928).
63. See 1943-44 RP. OF ATr'Y GEN. OF MicH. 528; cf. Rose v. Daily Mirror, 284
N.Y. 335, 31 N.E.2d 182 (1940).
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impetus necessary to overcome the barrier of mootness.6 4 Because of these
further threats to a defendant's freedom after a sentence has been served,
this area does not seem an appropriate one to apply mootness for economy
reasons. * In addition, the interests of a defendant and of a state in the
result of such an appeal would seem to be sufficiently strong to insure truly
adversary argument.
Expiration of Licenses.-Another frequently recurring situation is
that an appeal from the refusal to renew or issue a short-term license is not
heard until the license would have expired. Formerly, the appeal would
be dismissed as presenting no issue upon which the judgment of the court
could operate, i.e., dismissed because moot.65 Most courts today will look
farther than the immediate effect of the expiration and will hear the appeal
on the merits whenever the denial of the license wil have a future effect
on the applicant.6 6 This includes cases in which no license may be issued
for a specified period of time after revocation or denial of renewal,67 cases
in which the licensee can show a continuing interest in conducting a busi-
ness or profession,68 cases which involve licenses of so short a term that
appellate review could almost never be obtained under the old rule,69 and
other cases in which loss of license would have other serious detrimental
effects."0 This rule, in granting review where the applicant can show an
effect upon an interest other than his good name as a licensee, is clearly
analogous to the rule developed in the cases dealing with satisfaction of
criminal sentences. 71 Some courts have also expressed the fear that to
64. It does not appear that this point was specifically rejected by any of the
decisions. It has been held that an habitual criminal statute provides an adequate
basis to permit "a motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobig" in the
federal courts. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 (1954).
65. E.g., Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 200 U.S. 446 (1906) ; Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 200 U.S. 450 (1906).
66. E.g., Heuston v. Gilman, 98 Colo. 301, 56 P.2d 40 (1936); Burke v. Cole-
man, 356 Mo. 594, 202 S.W.2d 809 (1947); Drozdowski v. Mayor and Council of
Sayreville, 134 N.J.L. 566, 49 A.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1946). See also cases cited notes
67-70 infra.
67. Barretta v. Cocreham, 210 La. 55, 26 So.2d 286 (1946); Seila's Liquor
License Case, 124 Pa. Super. 519, 190 Atl. 203 (1937) ; Revocation of Wolf's License,
115 Pa. Super. 514, 176 AtI. 260 (1935).
68. Leonard & Leonard v. Earle, 279 U.S. 392 (1929); Leakey v. Georgia Real
Estate Comn'n, 80 Ga. App. 272, 55 S.E.2d 818 (1949); State v. Otterholt, 234
Iowa 1286, 15 N.W.2d 529 (1944). See In re Carter, 192 F.2d 15, 29 (1951)
(concurring opinion) ; cf. Gilchrist v. Bierring, 234 Iowa 899, 914-15, 14 N.W.2d 724,
731-32 (1944).
Where the period of the ban on getting a new license had also expired, a court
declared the suit moot: Rayahel v. McCampbell, 55 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1932).
69. Technical Radio Laboratory v. Federal Radio Conm'n, 36 F.2d 111 (D.C.
Cir. 1929) (renewal valid for only three months); Close v. Southern Md. Agric.
Ass'n, 134 Md. 629, 108 Atl. 209 (1919) (thirteen day racing meeting); Peppers
Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 198 Okla. 451, 179 P.2d 899 (1947).
70. Feight v. State Real Estate Comm'n, 151 Neb. 867, 39 N.W2d 823 (1949)
(stigma of conviction); Miller v. Lutheran Conf. and Camp Ass'n, 331 Pa. 241,
200 Atl. 646 (1938).
71. See text at notes 55-64 mupra.
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deny review of such actions could lead to abuses by administrative agencies
in the enforcement of licensing statutes.72
CONTINUING CONTROVERSIES
The federal courts have developed a doctrine which permits the deci-
sion of certain cases which otherwise would be dismissed as moot. They
will decide a case which is moot on its exact facts, but which represents
a continuing controversy between the parties which has not been settled73
and which is likely to remain unsettled without the decision.74 This theory
was prompted in part by the same fear of administrative abuses which was
a guiding factor in establishing the present rule regarding license cases.75
The foundation of the continuing controversy doctrine is Southern Pacific
Terminal Co. v. ICC,7 6 in which the validity of an ICC cease and desist
order, limited by its own terms to two years, was challenged as outside
the authority of the Commission. The Court, in holding that it could
review the validity of the order even though the two year limit had expired,
said:
"The questions involved in the orders of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission are usually continuing (as are manifestly those in
the case at bar) and their consideration ought not to be, as they
might be, defeated, by short term orders capable of repetition, yet
evading review, and at one time the Government and at another time
the carriers have their rights determined by the Commission without
a chance of redress." 7
Where an administrative ruling which has been suspended probably wil
be reinstated, the same rule applies, and the court will hear the appeal. 8
72. Kenworthey & Taylor, Inc. v. State Examiners of Electricians, 320 Mass.
451, 70 N.E.2d 247 (1946), and cases cited in note 117 infra.
73. Cf. United States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U.S. 812 (1929). See text at
notes 25-27 supra.
74. Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246 (1946) ; Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc., 321
U.S. 671, 075 (1944); Papaliolios v. Durning, 175 F2d 73 (2d Cir. 1949); Morris
v. Williams, 149 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1945); United States v. Railway Employees'
Dep't, AFL, 286 Fed. 228 (N.D. Ill. 1923); Boise City Irr. & Land Co. v. Clark,
131 Fed. 415, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1904). But cf. St. Pierre v. United States, 319
U.S. 41 (1943). Some state courts have also adopted this rule. See, e.g., New
Bedford v. New Bedford, Woods Hole, etc. S.S. Authority, 330 Mass. 422, 114
N.E.2d 553 (1953).
75. See text at and following note 65 supra.
76. 219 U.S. 498 (1911). See also Southern Pacific Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 433
(1911).
77. 219 U.S. at 515. Cited as authority for the decision were United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), discussed following note 83
infra, and Boise City Irr. & Land Co. v. Clark, 131 Fed. 415 (9th Cir. 1904), which,
in alternative holdings, applied both the continuing controversy theory and the public
interest theory. See text at notes 105-36 infra.
78. United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 555-56 (1939);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 412-14 (1935); Gay Union Corp. v.
Wallace, 112 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 647 (1940); Yarnell
v. Hillsborough Packing Co., 70 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir. 1934); cf. Ford Motor
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An important element of these cases seems to be the likelihood of repetition
of the order directed against the identical conduct involved in the case
at bar.719 However, an unfortunate tendency seems to exist in some of the
opinions not to emphasize this element, especially where the order is one
which theoretically extends to future conduct and is designed to protect
the rights of the public,80 but to decide the cases as continuing contro-
versies merely because the parties are still at odds over the legality of an
order which most likely will never be repeated. This tendency is par-
ticularly prevalent in cases involving orders issued by the National Labor
Relations Board and the Federal Trade Commission, which are con-
sidered by the courts even though the immediate object of the order has
been accomplished or has become impossible of accomplishment.81 Such
orders are generally broadly phrased and are directed at the prevention of
future violations; thus they fit within the broad definition of continuing
controversies despite the lack of the guarantee of an adverse interest in
the one person to whom the order was directed. However, it seems un-
likely that courts would be willing to cede so important an area of govern-
ment regulation to the agencies involved merely because many of the
appeals from these orders are technically moot; judicial review over these
important agencies would then become spotty and irregular.
Voluntary Cessation.-The archetype of the continuing controversy
doctrine exists where the defendant has voluntarily ceased activity alleged
to be violative of the plaintiff's rights.u The original case on the subject
is United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,ss which was an
injunction proceeding, under the Sherman Act, against an allegedly un-
lawful combination. The defendant won in the trial court and court of
appeals, and then dissolved. It never admitted the illegality of the com-
bination, nor professed any intention to recombine, but it did argue that
its dissolution was for a purpose other than evasion of the pending action.
The Supreme Court held that the case was not moot, stating that the
rights of the public, which the Government was seeking to enforce, should
not be foreclosed merely because the defendant voluntarily ceased its al-
legedly illegal activities. The Court's principal concern seemed to be
Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303, 313 (1948). Analogous state court decisions:
Peppers Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 198 Okla. 451, 179 P.2d 899 (1947) ;
New Bedford v. New- Bedford, Woods Hole, etc. S.S. Authority, 330 Mass. 422, 114
N.E.2d 553 (1953); Doering v. Swoboda, 214 Wis. 481, 253 N.W. 657 (1934). See
also cases cited throughout the public interest section, at notes 105-36 infra.
79. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
80. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Martin, 202 F2d 398 (3d Cir. 1953).
81. FTC v. Goodyear -Tire & Rubber Co., 304 U.S. 257, 260 (1938); Chamber
of Commerce v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673, 686 (8th Cir. 1926); Guarantee Veterinary
Co. v. FTC, 285 Fed. 853, 859 (2d Cir. 1922) ; NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills,
Inc., 337 U.S. 217, 225 (1949); NLRB v. E. C. Atklns & Co., 331 U.S. 398 (1947);
NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 271 (1938).
82. See Diamond, Federal Jurisdiction to Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. op PA. L.
REv. 125, 135-37 (1946).
83. 166 U.S. 290, 307-10 (1897).
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that the defendant would reorganize 8 4 and, by repeated dissolution and
reorganization, completely evade the Sherman Act.
Recently, it has been held that if the defendant can demonstrate that
"there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated," the
case will be dismissed as moot.8 5 Where the activity was stopped because
of circumstances beyond the control of the parties,8 6 or where the cause
of the cessation was obviously unrelated to the litigation,8 7 the cases have
been dismissed. Of course, where the plaintiff has prevailed below and
the activity has been terminated pursuant to court decree, the appeal will
be heard.88
Repeal of Statutes.-When a statute has been repealed without a
saving clause, proceedings begun under it are moot.89 Generally, it is mere
speculation to say that a statute may be reenacted, and the courts will
insist that a more probable issue be presented. However, where a new
statute has been passed which will present substantially the same issues
as are before the court in a case under the repealed statute, the case has
been held to be of a continuing nature.9 1 In FTC v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.92 the defendant was charged with making a certain contract
granting a preference alleged to be unfair under the Clayton Act. The
defendant denied that the contract violated that Act. During pendency
of the action, the Robinson-Patman Act, which obviously banned the con-
tract, was passed, and the defendant abandoned it. However, both plain-
tiff and defendant desired to obtain a Supreme Court ruling on the Clayton
Act question. The Court held that "neither the transactions subsequent
84. At least some of the members of the defendant association had formed an-
other association. Id. at 305-06, 308-09.
85. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953), in which the
district court had found as a fact that the wrong would not be repeated even
though, after five years of administrative urging, the defendant refused to admit
the illegality of its practice or to promise not to repeat it. This qualification was
developed in Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419 (1945)
(voluntary discontinuance of disputed labor contract); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana)
v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 181-82 (1931) (voluntary cancellation of objection-
able contract terms). But cf. Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37,
42-43 (1944) (voluntary discontinuance of disputed labor contract).
86. United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft,
239 U.S. 466, 475-78 (1916) ; United States v. American-Asiatic Steamship Co., 242
U.S. 537 (1917). But cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416, 448 (2d Cir. 1945).
87. Cf. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 312 n.5 (1946) ; Fisher v. Baker,
203 U.S. 174, 181 (1906).
88. Bakery Sales Drivers v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437, 442 (1948); cf. Eagles
v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 306-08 (1946) ; Commercial Cable
Co. v. Burleson, 250 U.S. 360 (1919) (activity terminated pursuant to presidential
decree).
89. United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920); Flanigan v. Sierra
County, 196 U.S. 553 (1905); State ex rel. Bennett v. Brown, 216 Minn. 135, 12
N.W.2d 180 (1943); cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R. 258 U.S.
13 (1922). See also, United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1934)
(repeal of 18th Amendment rendered prosecution moot).
90. Spreckels Sugar Co. v. Wickard, 131 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
91. Cf. Campbell v. California, 200 U.S. 87, 92-93 (19G6). When no possibility
of the same harm exists under the amended act, the case is moot. Berry v. Davis,
242 U.S. 468 (1917); Dinsmore v. Southern Express Co. and Ga. R.R. Comm'n,
183 U.S. 115 (1901).
92. 304 U.S. 257 (1938), reversing 92 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1937).
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to that order nor the passage of the amendatory Act deprived the respond-
ent of its right to challenge the order and to have its validity determined." "
Although the Robinson-Patman Act had a saving clause, and although
the order in question was a cease and desist order styled by the Court as
"continuing," it is submitted that the only contingency under which the
order could have any practical significance is if the Robinson-Patman Act
were to be repealed, which, it would seem, is no less speculative than the
contingency that a repealed act will be reenacted.
Election Cases.-Cases involving election laws and procedures would
seem to fall within the continuing controversy doctrine, but the courts have
not so held. Voters who were being disenfranchised have sued in equity for
mandatory or injunctive relief. Often, too, candidates have resorted to
the courts to secure a place on the ballot for either primary or general
elections, to secure recounts of the votes or to challenge other alleged
irregularities in election procedures.9 4 Frequently, by the time these cases
reached the Supreme Court, the election had been held or the term of office
which the plaintiff sought had expired.95 Even if the election had not been
held, the intervening time might be so short that no decree could give the
relief requested.96 It would seem that where the plaintiff is seeking the
right to vote in all elections, as when he alleges that the procedures fol-
lowed by his state are unconstitutional, his standing to secure judicial re-
view of the denial of this continuing right should not be lost merely be-
cause the legal machinery is slow. Where a candidate seeks a place on
the ballot for a particular election, a decision in his favor after the election
probably will do him no good.9 7 But where the procedure for placing
minority parties on the ballot has been challenged, and there is the likeli-
hood that the same minority party will be seeking such a place in the
future, it would be desirable to decide the question under the continuing
controversy doctrine.98 In Cole v. Chief of Police of Fall River,99 the
plaintiff was a candidate for public office who sought to enjoin the defendant
from enforcing a local ordinance which the latter contended unconstitution-
ally prohibited the method of campaigning used by the plaintiff. By the
time the case reached the state supreme court, the plaintiff had lost the
election. Although he claimed that he would seek other offices and
desired to use the same campaign methods in the future, his case was dis-
missed as moot.
93. Id. at 260.
94. Shub v. Simpson, 340 U.S. 861 (1950); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281,
284 (1948) (concurring opinion); DeHoff v. Imeson, 153 Fla. 553, 15 So.2d 258
(1943); Brown v. Lieb, 267 Pa. 24, 110 Atl. 463 (1920).
95. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895) ; Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946);
Love v. Griffith, 266 U.S. 32 (1924); Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904);
DeHoff v. Imeson, 153 Fla. 553, 15 So.2d 258 (1943).
96. Ex parte James, 287 U.S. 572 (1932) ; Sartin v. Barlow, 196 Miss. 159, 16
So.2d 372 (1944).
97. E.g., Shub v. Simpson, 340 U.S. 861 (1950).
98. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948). But cf. Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549 (1946) (allegedly unconstitutional gerrymandering); Richardson v.
McChesney, 218 U.S. 487 (1910) (same).
99. 312 Mass. 523, 45 N.E.2d 400 (1942).
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Such a holding presents dangers of its own, for to enable election
officials to prevent all judicial review by delaying tactics is hardly cal-
culated to assure fair dealing to all, regardless of political affiliation. A
solution which has been utilized in election cases is advancement of the
case to the top of the argument list, with every effort being made by the
judges to decide it as quickly as possible before it becomes moot.1'0 An
example of such a procedure, involving two separate court systems, is
Ray v. Blair.1° 1 On January 29, the plaintiff filed for a place on the
primary ballot, and the final decisiofi was announced by the United States
Supreme Court on April 3, in ample time for the election in June. It took
only one month to get a decision by the Alabama Supreme Court, 0 2 and
only thirty-four days for the highest court of the land to hear and decide
the case.
A somewhat different method has been devised to assure that cases
involving alleged disenfranchisement will remain vital controversies so that
Supreme Court rulings may be obtained. Rather than seek equity relief,
the potential voter attempts to cast his ballot and, following denial of the
privilege, sues the election official for damages 10 3 Then, instead of a moot
case, the Court is faced with a suit for damages caused by state action in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This procedure, although it
does not attempt to secure to the plaintiff a vote in the particular election,
has resulted in some historic decisions affirming to minority groups their
access to the ballot.10 4
THE PUBLIC INTEREST EXCEPTION
Many state courts have adopted an exception to the general rule of
mootness by deciding moot cases when questions of great public interest are
involved. Although this doctrine is not recognized by the federal courts,0 5
some of the state courts often cite certain language in the Trans-Missouri
case10 6 as a basis for the proposition. The facts of that case indicate that
100. Such a procedure may be justified as an exercise of the judicial power to
make rules of procedure and is warranted by the peculiar nature of these cases,
which require prompt action by the courts to protect one of our most precious
privileges.
101. Decision reported, 343 U.S. 154, opinion reported, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
102. 257 Ala. 151, 57 So.2d 395 (1952).
103. The damages are set at an arbitrary figure high enough to meet all jurisdic-
tional requirements regarding amount, usually $5000 or $10,000. See cases cited in
note 104 infra.
104. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927).
105. Campbell Soup Co. v. Martin, 202 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1953). Contra:
Boise City Irr. & Land Co. v. Clark, 131 Fed. 415, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1904) (alterna-
tive holding). See Diamond, supra note 82, at 138: "It seems significant
that no case [in the Supreme Court] relies on public interest as the sole basis
for exercising jurisdiction, and it is often expressed as a ground for retaining a
jurisdiction which had properly attached at the commencement of the litigation.'
106. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 309 (1897):
"Here, however, there has been no extinguishment of the rights (whatever they
are) of the public, the enforcement of which the Government has endeavored to
procure by a judgment of a court under the provisions of the [Sherman] act . . .
above cited."
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the decision was grounded on the fear that the members of the defendant
association would regroup and form another association which, while
nominally a new entity, would in reality be merely a continuation of the
challenged combination. 10 7 As developed from the Trans-Missouri case,
the continuing controversy doctrine permits decision of a case which is
technically moot but represents only one phase of a still-existing dispute
between the same parties. The public interest exception applies to moot
questions which will arise again, but there is no requirement that the same
parties will be involved in the subsequent controversy.
Importance of the Issues.-Although many of the opinions fail to
delineate the basis for the exception, the principal requirement, discussed by
most courts, is that the case involve issues important to the citizenry as a
whole, as when the state acts as substantial trustee for the public in public
utility regulation.'0 8 A case affecting only a private associated group of
individuals, no matter how large, will not qualify for the exception.
109 It
has been stated, very often by the United States Supreme Court, that the
more important a case is, the more necessary is compliance with the tradi-
tional requirements for the exercise of the judicial power11° This is true
in regard to the first reason for the mootness doctrine-the requirement of
adversity because of the danger of an unsound decision. Although it has
been argued that a decision will remove much of the doubt and uncertainty
which would result if such issues should remain undecided and will
establish a basis for dealings by the persons or groups affected,"' this
attempted justification only points out that people may be acting on an
unsound decision. The second reason for mootness rules-economy of
judicial endeavor-does not apply where the questions are very important
to the whole public. Many of the decisions in moot cases have been relied
upon as precedent; but even if they are not considered binding, the court
can give enough indication of its thinking to bring about some concrete
results, since presumably counselors and lower courts will refer to the opin-
ion whenever the same or similar issues arise. Thus, it is not true that a
court's judgment in a moot case will have no effect.
107. See text following note 82 supra.
108. See Willis v. Buchman, 240 Ala. 386, 389, 199 So. 892, 895 (1940). See
also, Jones v. Crawford, 258 Ala. 278, 62 So.2d 221 (1952); Payne v. Jones, 193
Okla. 609, 146 P.2d 113 (1944) (collection of public revenue) ; Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd. v. Allis-Chalmers Workers' Union, 252 Wis. 436, 32 N.W.2d
190 (1948) (enforcement of labor relations statute). But cf. Wortex Mills, Inc. v.
Textile Workers Union, 369 Pa. 359, 85 A.2d 851 (1952).
109. North Dakota Wheat Growers Ass'n v. Moore, 52 N.D. 904, 204 N.W.
834 (1925) (corporation with 15,000 members) ; cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Martin,
202 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1953) (contracts between plaintiff and a large number of
farmers). But cf. Maloney v. United Mine Workers, 308 Pa. 251, 162 Atl. 225
(1932).
110. Frankfurter, J., in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
594 (1952) (concurring opinion); HAuuus, THE JUDIcIAL PowER OF THE UrrED
STATEs 13 (1940): "Greater emphasis seems to be placed on the necessity of
adverse parties with substantial interests in proceedings where the validity of the
statute or order is questioned than in the other classes." See also, Cole v. Chief
of Police of Fall River, 312 Mass. 523, 45 N.E2d 400 (1942) ; State ex rel. Reilly v.
Gress, 65 N.D. 184, 256 N.W. 721 (1934).
111. See text at note 11 and note 11 supra.
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Four principal categories of cases are considered sufficiently important
to invoke the public interest exception. The first class consists of election
matters. It is obviously of great importance to the electorate that the
highest court of the jurisdiction definitely settle questions involving the
propriety of holding an election, 1 2 the right of candidates to have their
names placed on the ballot,11 3 the right of citizens to vote, and the pro-
cedures of preparing, counting or certifying ballots.1 14  In Sartin v.
Barlow 5 the county district attorney alleged fraud and corruption in the
vote count at a primary election and brought a mandamus action against
the county clerk to enable the candidates to open the ballot boxes. Al-
though the general election was to be held the day after the opinion was
announced, the court ordered the clerk to make the ballot boxes available
for inspection whenever the parties complied with the statutory procedure
for making a demand. Delaying tactics employed by the county had pre-
vented early decision, and the court feared that to allow such tactics to de-
feat review would enable wholesale evasion of the state's corrupt practices
act.
This fear of administrative abuses is also an element in the second
general category of cases, those in which the rulings of administrative
agencies are challenged but become moot before reaching the court. An
example of this category is the license cases considered previously."L6 In
some other situations, even though the plaintiff retains no residuum of
interest as required by the license doctrine, review may be obtained under
the public interest exception because the courts believe that the desirability
of having a rule established for the agency's conduct in similar future situa-
tions outweighs the dangers inherent in deciding moot cases." 7  A tacit
112. Pitt v. Belote, 108 Fla. 292, 146 So. 380 (1933); Dove v. Oglesby, 114
Okla. 144, 244 Pac. 798 (1926); Brown v. Leib, 267 Pa. 24, 110 At. 463 (1920);
cf. Maloney v. United Mine Workers, 308 Pa. 251, 162 Atl. 225 (1932).
113. Higgins v. Barnhill, 218 Ark. 466, 236 S.W.2d 1011 (1951); Carroll v.
Schneider, 211 Ark. 538, 201 S.W.2d 221 (1947); Brown v. Leib, 267 Pa. 24, 110
Ati. 463 (1920). But cf. Lloyd v. Board of Supervisors, 111 A.2d 379 (Md. 1954).
114. Dotson v. Ritchie, 211 Ark. 789, 202 S.W.2d 603 (1947); Kensinger v.
Schaal, 200 Ind. 275, 161 N.E. 262 (1928); Wattles ex rel. Johnson v. Upjohn, 211
Mich. 514, 179 N.W. 335 (1920); Sartin v. Barlow, 196 Miss. 159, 16 So.2d 372
(1944). But cf. J. B. Lyon Co. v. Morris, 261 N.Y. 497, 185 N.E. 711 (1933)
(contract to print ballots).
115. 196 Miss. 159, 16 So.2d 372 (1944).
116. Text at notes 65-72 supra.
117. Liquor board's authority to issue, suspend or revoke license: Van DeVegt
v. Board of Comm'rs of Larimer County, 98 Colo. 161, 55 P.2d 703 (1936) ; Brown
v. Baumer, 301 Ky. 315, 191 S.W.2d 235 (1945) ; Glenram Wine & Liquor Corp. v.
O'Connell, 295 N.Y. 336, 67 N.E.2d 570 (1946); Perry v. Oregon Liquor Control
Comm'n, 180 Ore. 495, 177 P.2d 406 (1947). But cf. People ex rel. Cairo Turf
Club, Inc. v. Taylor, 2 Ill.2d 160, 116 N.E.2d 880 (1954) (no likelihood of repetition).
Contra: Bartholomew v. Heil, 307 Ky. 686, 211 S.W.2d 673 (1947). Other cases
are: St. Patrick's Church Corp. v. Daniels, 113 Conn. 132, 154 Atl. 343 (1931)
(zoning variance); Florida ex rel. Railroad Comm'rs v. Southern Tel. & Constr.
Co., 65 Fla. 67, 61 So. 119 (1913) (authority of utility board to compel service by
telephone company) ; People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ili. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769
(1952) (authority of juvenile court to order medical treatment of child over parents'
religious objections) ; Rosenbluth v. Finkelstein, 300 N.Y. 402, 91 N.E.2d 581 (1950)
(interpretation of Emergency Housing Act) ; State ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 197 Ore.
96, 252 P.2d 550 (1953) (authority of state tax comm'n to review local assessment
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example of this rule is found in the NLRB and FTC cases discussed
above.
118
A similar rationale is applied when the question relates to local govern-
ment powers or procedures. 119 The reasoning is particularly relevant
where the issues could arise throughout the state, as when municipal au-
thority under a state statute is questioned.20 Although the public inter-
est exception was not applied, a series of recent cases in Massachusetts
will serve to illustrate the function of the exception in this field.' 2 The
state statutory procedure for annual assessment of the value of utility
property required that a certain administrative decision be made before
December 1 of the calendar assessment year. In one of the cases, the
administrative decision was not rendered until over a year later; the court
dismissed the appeal from this decision as moot, saying that an appeal
could never be completed in the required length of time and that no
machinery was available to provide judicial review in this area.12 2  In
successive cases, both the administrative and judicial processes were
speeded up, until, in the most recent case, the court passed on the appeal
methods) ; McCanless v. Klein, 182 Tenn. 631, 188 S.W2d 745 (1945) (liquor board's
authority to require approval of new brand before sale); :Peppers Refining Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 198 Okla. 451, 179 P.2d 899 (1947) (authority of corporation
commission to reduce oil production quotas); Morad v. Wyoming Highway Dep't, 66
Wyo. 12, 203 P.2d 954 (1949) (interpretation of Drivers License Act).
An apparently unique provision is found in CAL CODE Civ. Paoc. § 1094.5 (f)
(1953), which provides that if a final administrative order is challenged "while the
penalty imposed is in full force and effect the determination shall not be considered
to have become moot" where the order expires or is complied with during the pendency
of the appeal. See 6 Ops. Arr'y Gm. oF CAiF. 305 (1945) (license revoked
for stated period, period expired).
118. See text at note 81 supra.
119. Wise v. First Nat. Bank, 49 Ariz. 146, 65 P.2d 1154 (1937) (city's duty
to meet bond payments) ; Page v. Blunt, 126 Colo. 324, 248 P.2d 1074 (1952) (city's
authority under liquor control act) ; Golden v. People ex rel. Baker, 101 Colo. 381,
74 P.2d 715 (1937) (same); Wattles ex rel. Johnson v. Upjohn, 211 Mich. 514, 179
N.W. 335 (1920) (validity of city's voting system) ; Cox v. City Council of Bristol,
144 Va. 286, 132 S.E. 187 (1926) (application of statute to city charter). But cf.
Price v. Cohen, 109 A.2d 920 (Md. 1954) (authority of acting mayor under city
charter to discharge appointed city official).
Cases not decided for other reasons: no likelihood of repetition: State ex rel.
Ingle v. Holcomb, 199 Okla. 282, 185 P.2d 905 (1947) (appointment and tenure of
school district officers) ; Keller v. Rewers, 189 Ind. 339, 127 N.E. 149 (1920) (city's
authority to regulate saloons). Holding unclear: State ex rel. Anderson v. Sieg,
63 N.D. 724, 249 N.W. 714 (1933) (authority of city council to hold recall election).
Other remedy available: Kiker v. Wewoka, 205 Okla. 90, 235 P.2d 710 (1951)
(city's authority to install parking meters).
120. Smith v. Ballas, 335 Ill. App. 418, 82 N.E.2d 181 (1948) (interpretation
of liquor control act by city) ; State ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 197 Ore. 96, 252 P.2d
550 (1953) (authority of state tax comm'n to review local assessment methods);
Pardee v. Schuylkill County, 276 Pa. 246, 120 At. 139 (1923) (authority of county
tax comm'rs).
121. In chronological order, these cases are: Commissioner of Corps. and Taxa-
tion v. Assessors of Springfield, 329 Mass. 419, 108 N.E.2d 670 (1952); Commis-
sioner of Corps. and Taxation v. Assessors of Springfield, 330 Mass. 433, 114
N.E.2d 550 (1953); Commissioner of Corps. and Taxation v. Assessors of Haver-
hill (two cases), 330 Mass. 553, 116 N.E2d 151 (1953); State Tax Comm'n
v. Assessors of Haverhill [and Springfield] (four cases), 118 N.E.2d 745 (Mass.
1954) ; State Tax Comm'n v. Assessors of Springfield, 122 N.E.2d 372 (Mass. 1954).
122. "If a remedy is needed, it lies beyond our province to provide one," State
Tax Comm'n v. Assessors of Haverhill, 118 N.E.2d 745, 747 (Mass. 1954).
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on November 1 of the assessment year.12 3  Application of the public in-
terest exception in the first case would have eliminated the need for a
costly series of cases involving the same issues. 2 4 Even more significant,
the curative method of speeding up the legal machinery may not be avail-
able in every case of this nature.
The final major category of important questions is found in cases
involving the constitutionality of a statute. Where many persons are
affected by the statute, its validity is thought to be so important that a
decision on it should be given without waiting until the issue is raised
again.1 25  However, other courts have held that the doctrines restraining
judicial power apply particularly to constitutional issues, and have refused
to decide moot cases involving those issues.126 This view is strongly
supported by the United States Supreme Court in the limitations on the
judicial power expressed in its opinions.127
Other Factors.-In addition to the requirement that a matter of great
importance be involved, two other factors are found in the factual situa-
tions of these cases which no doubt have an important influence on the
court's willingness to invoke the public interest exception. Since there
is little to be gained by deciding a moot case which is unique,28 the first
factor is that the factual situation will recur frequently. 129 However, this
factor may be employed as an argument for dismissal. If the case is one
which may arise soon again, the detrimental effects of postponing a decision
123. State Tax Comm'n v. Assessors of Springfield, 122 N.E.2d 372 (Mass.
1954). It is interesting to note that the decision of the administrative board in this
case was reversed because of errors in procedure and the admission of evidence. No
final determination of the assessment value of the property has yet been made by the
court.
124. Cf. State ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 197 Ore. 96, 252 P2d 550 (1953). The
continuing controversy doctrine could probably have been applied also, since the
parties were the same throughout the series of cases. See text following note 107
supra.
125. Golden v. People ex rel. Baker, 101 Colo. 381, 74 P.2d 715 (1937) ; Pitt v.
Belote, 108 Fla. 292, 146 So. 380 (1933); Letz Mfg. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n
of Ind., 210 Ind. 467, 4 N.E2d 194 (1936); Dove v. Oglesby, 114 Okla. 144, 244
Pac. 798 (1926); State ex rel. Stadter v. Newbry, 196 Ore. 331, 248 P.2d 840
(1952); State ex rel. Scandlyn v. Trotter, 153 Tenn. 30, 281 S.W. 925 (1925);
Doering v. Swoboda, 214 Wis. 481, 253 N.W. 657 (1934); cf. State ex rel. Steere
v. Franklin County Farm Bureau, 172 Kan. 179, 239 P.2d 570 (1951).
126. See cases cited in note 110 supra; Donato v. Board of Barber Examiners,
56 Cal. App2d 916, 133 P.2d 490 (1943); State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 39 Del.
187, 197 Atl. 478 (1938).
127. See, e.g., Brandeis, J., in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936)
(concurring opinion).
128. Because no likelihood of repetition was found, these cases were held to be
moot: State ex rel. Ingle v. Holcomb, 199 Okla. 282, 185 P2d 905 (1947) ; People
ex rel. Cairo Turf Club, Inc. v. Taylor, 2 Ill.2d 160, 116' N.E.2d 880 (1954);
J. B. Lyon Co. v. Morris, 261 N.Y. 497, 185 N.E. 711 (1933); Keller v. Rewers,
189 Ind. 339, 127 N.E. 149 (1920). A decision on the merits of a unique moot
case would be of academic interest only.
129. Almassy v. Los Angeles County Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 34 Cal2d 387, 210
P.2d 503 (1949); Terry v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 108 Cal. App.2d 861, 240 P.2d
691 (1952); Page v. Blunt, 126 Colo. 324, 248 P.2d 1074 (1952); Van DeVegt v.
Board of Comm'rs of Larimer County, 98 Colo. 161, 55 P2d 703 (1936); People
ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952); Payne v. Jones,
193 Okla. 609, 146 P.2d 113 (1944); Werner v. King, 310 Pa. 120, 164 Atl. 918
(1933); Doering v. Swoboda, 214 Wis. 481, 253 N.W. 657 (1934).
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will be alleviated within a short time, when the other cases come up on
appeal. 130 This argument gives rise to the conjunctive factor that the
future cases will probably be moot also.18 The disputed matter may exist
for only a short period of time,132 e.g., a short term license; 233 or the
matter may have required prompt action, as in People ex rel. Wallace v.
Labrenz,184 where an immediate transfusion was necessary to save a child's
life and the lower court had authorized it despite the parents' religious ob-
jections. Such a case would always be moot, for if the transfusion were
not given, the child would die, and if it were given, the propriety of order-
ing it done is then a dead issue.
In order to guarantee that the public interest exception will not destroy
the principle of mootness, the three factors of effect on the public interest,
future recurrence, and future mootness should be regarded as cumulative
requirements. Even if all three are present, there still exists the danger
that the lack of truly adversary argument will result in an unfortunate
decision. Of course, a party may believe that he has a great interest in
the disposition of the case, even though a court ordinarily would not
recognize the interest as sufficient to render a decision. In these instances
the party would have the incentive which is basic to the adversary system.135
Also, it is possible that the importance of the issues in the public interest
cases may be a sufficient spur so that the party who does not have sufficient
personal interest will still present proper argument or the court will arrive
at the most desirable decision without proper argument: When a court
decides a moot case under this exception, it should do so frankly and only
after a conscientious attempt to make up for the probable lack of proper
argument by diligent research and thorough analysis on its own part.136
130. See San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1885).
131. This element may also be argued both ways. It may be contended that if
all cases which will arise will be moot, the chances are that the issues are so unim-
portant that the time of the appellate tribunal should not be taken up with such
matters. However, this argument is met by the requirement that the case involve
issues of great public importance.
132. Carroll v. Schneider, 211 Ark. 538, 201 S.W.2d 221 (1947); Sartin v.
Barlow, 196 Miss. 159, 16 So.2d 372 (1944) ; Peppers Refining Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 198 Okla. 451, 179 P.2d 899 (1947); Payne v. Jones, 193 Okla. 609, 146
P.2d 113 (1944); Doering v. Swoboda, 214 Wis. 481, 253 N.W. 657 (1934). This
element was not found in Oregon State Grange v. McKay, 193 Ore. 627, 238 P.2d
778 (1951), rehearing denied, 193 Ore. 631, 239 P.2d 834 (1952), and the court
properly refused, on rehearing, to apply the public interest exception. Cf. Kiker v.
Wewoka, 205 Okla. 90, 235 P.2d 710 (1951) (plaintiff could obtain decision on
merits by pursuing remedy for damages).
133. E.g., Close v. Southern Md. Agric. Ass'n, 134 Md. 629, 108 At. 209 (1919)
(13 day racing season) ; and other cases cited in note 69 supra.
134. 411 Ill. 618, .104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
135. A party may retain some interest without retaining enough to permit the
decision of the case under the continuing controversy doctrine. An example of this
may be found where the probability of repetition of the controversy depends entirely
on one party. Even though the continuing controversy doctrine might not permit
decision of the case, the public interest exception would so permit if the other elements
were present.
136. An interesting sidelight is the practice of the federal courts in patent cases.
Although "to hold a patent valid if it is not infringed is to decide a hypothetical
case," Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943), lower federal courts have
been advised to dispose of patent infringement suits on the grounds of invalidity
rather than non-infringement where possible, Sinclair Co. v. Interchemical Corp.,
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However, if the decision of a moot case involves extra work by the court,
economy of judicial endeavor requires that such decisions be rendered
only where the questions are so important that the interest in having them
decided justifies the added work load on the judiciary.
The need for recognition of the interdependence of the three factors
is heightened by the realization that the courts rely most strongly on the
public right factor even though it is the one most vulnerable to criticism.
The possibility of an unsound decision is most significant when the issues
are important ones, and in such cases the courts should respect all the
limitations on judicial power. The proper scope of the public interest
exception then becomes more narrow, being limited to questions of great
public importance which recur often but which probably will be moot
upon reaching the appellate level. In many of these cases, the public's
need for a judicial check on the executive and legislative branches of gov-
ernment will require that the court render a decision.
PROcUD=RE
Since, by hypothesis, the court's order cannot affect the rights of the
parties to a moot case, many courts will simply dismiss the appeal when-
ever such a case is presented.13 7 This procedure is tantamount to affirming
the judgment of the lower court,138 and leaves it in effect. However, in a
significant number of cases, the plaintiff may be able to protect his rights
through another action on a different legal theory.'3 9 Such a situation was
presented in United States v. Munsingwear,14° in which the United States
had sued to enjoin alleged violations of price regulations and also had
sought treble damages. The damage action was held in abeyance pending
decision on the injunction suit. The lower court held for the defendant
in this suit, and before review could be obtained the regulations were re-
325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945). If the lower court should rule on both questions as alter-
native holdings, the plaintiff must appeal on both, or he presents a moot case-he
cannot agree on the issue of non-infringement and still attempt to remove the holding
that his patent is invalid. Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F2d 541 (2d Cir. 1942). But
cf. Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939).
137. Love v. Griffith, 266 U.S. 32 (1924) ; Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895);
Willis v. Buchman, 240 Ala. 386, 199 So. 892 (1940); Carroll v. Schneider, 211
Ark. 538, 201 S.W.2d 221 (1947); Dunn v. Dunn, 96 Ind. App. 620, 185 N.E. 334
(1933); Fox v. Holman, 95 Ind. App. 598, 184 N.E. 194 (1933); State v. Sieg,
63 N.D. 724, 249 N.W. 714 (1933); In re Kaeppler, 7 N.D. 307, 75 N.W. 253
(1898); Washington v. Cleland, 49 Ore. 12, 88 Pac. 305 (1907); Werner v. King,
310 Pa. 120, 164 Atl. 918 (1933) ; Maloney v. United Mine Workers, 308 Pa. 251,
162 Atl. 225 (1932); Brown v. Lieb, 267 Pa. 24, 110 AtI. 463 (1920); Morad v.
Wyoming Highway Dep't, 66 Wyo. 12, 203 P.2d 954 (1949).
138. Moot cases in which the judgment was affirmed: Swift & Co. v. Hocldng
Valley Ry., 243 U.S. 281 (1917); Higgins v. Barnhill, 218 Ark. 466, 236 S.W.2d
1011 (1951); Piper v. Hawley, 179 Cal. 10, 175 Pac. 417 (1918); Van DeVegt v.
Board of Comm'rs of Larimer County, 98 Colo. 161, 55 P.2d 703 (1936); Smith
v. Ballas, 335 Ill. App. 418, 82 N.E.2d 181 (1948); Letz Mfg. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 210 Ind. 467, 4 N.E.2d 194 (1936); State v. Franklin County Farm
Bureau, 172 Kan. 179, 239 P.2d 570 (1951); Feight v. State Real Estate Comm'n,
151 Neb. 867, 39 N.W.2d 823 (1949); State v. Trotter, 153 Tenn. 30, 281 S.W.
925 (1926).
139. See cases cited in notes 38-40 supra.
140. 340 U.S. 36 (1950), discussed in Developlieigs in the Lawv-Res Judicata,
65 HAv. L. REv. 818, 847, 848 (1952).
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pealed and the appeal was dismissed as moot. 4 1  Thereafter, the United
States sought to press the action for damages. The Supreme Court held
that the previous decision of the lower court was res j]dicata, pointing
out that the United States had acquiesced in the dismissal by failing to
object to that procedure.'1  To avoid such a result, many courts have
disposed of moot cases by vacating or reversing the judgment of the lower
court and remanding the cause with directions to dismiss the bill or com-
plaint, thus leaving no judgment on the record in the case.14 This pro-
cedure also prevents the lower court's judgment from standing as a prec-
edent, which would appear to be especially desirable, for example, where
a state wishes to reenact a statute declared unconstitutional by the lower
court in a case moot on appeal.14 Occasionally, exceptional situations have
arisen in which the courts have held that such procedure should not be
followed,1' but it would appear more desirable to permit the court in the
second case to exercise its discretion on the question of whether further
litigation is desirable rather than have the question foreclosed by failure
to invoke a procedural device, perhaps due to a party's oversight, in the
case which was moot. Such an exercise of discretion by a court in the moot
case would require some examination into the merits of the case and might
lead to a weakening of the restrictions on the decision of moot cases.146
Generally, in determining its final order, a court need not and should
not examine the issues of a moot case. In cases applying the public
interest exception, the judgment of the court should not purport to order
either party to do or refrain from doing any act, nor should it purport to
affirm or reverse the judgment of the lower court which makes such an
order.147 If a case has been made moot through the actions of one of the
141. Fleming v. Munsingwear, Inc., 162 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1947).
142. In St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943), the Court indicated that
the defendant's failure to apply for supersedeas could be regarded in the nature of
an estoppel, preventing review of his conviction. See text at note 42 supra. Cf.
Lloyd v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 111 A.2d 379, 380, 382 (Md. Ct. of
App. 1954). Since the state, as well as the defendant, has an interest in the effects
of a conviction of a crime, see note 58 supra, the conviction should not be vacated
unless it was erroneous.
143. This procedure is customary in the federal courts. See, e.g., United States
v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) ; Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U.S. 528, 532 (1926) ;
Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U.S. 216 (1923); Acheson v. Droesse, 197 F.2d 574
(D.C. Cir. 1952) and cases cited therein.
State courts: e.g., People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 80 N.E.2d 736 (1949);
Adirondack League Club v. Board of Black River Regulating Dist., 301 N.Y. 219,
93 N.E.2d 647 (1950) ; Brace v. Steele County, 77 N.D. 276, 42 N.W.2d 672 (1950) ;
San Antonio v. Brown, 50 S.W2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). See also cases cited
in note 147 infra.
144. Contra: State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 39 Del. 187, 197 Atl. 478 (Sup.
Ct. 1938).
145. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40 (1950); Cover v.
Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541, 546-47, (2d Cir. 1942). But cf. Acheson v. Droesse, 197
F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
146. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDEAL. SYSM
121-22 (1953).
147. Some courts applying the public interest exception follow the practice of the
cases cited note 143 supra, although, since there has been a fully considered decision
by the court on the merits, there is less reason to do so. Pitt v. Belote, 108 Fla.
292, 146 So. 380 (1933); Rosenbluth v. Finkelstein, 300 N.Y. 402, 91 N.E.2d 581
(1950).
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parties, a court can utilize this fact as a basis for awarding costs to the
other party,148 but even here there is no necessity for passing on the
issues in the case.
CONCLUSION
The best procedure for alleviating the problems raised by moot cases
is to accelerate the legal process whenever a case is presented which will
probably become moot because of normal docket delay. This has
been done with questions of public importance, principally election cases,
in the United States Supreme Court.149 Such procedure was also em-
ployed in the Massachusetts assessment cases discussed previously. 50  It
would seem that on a showing that the case will become moot, advance-
ment should be granted almost as a matter of course; otherwise effective
review will be denied in these cases.161 The difficulty in relying on this
procedure exclusively is that in some instances 15 2 it is not possible to
move quickly enough through the appellate process to secure a decision
before the case becomes moot.
Where possible, the plaintiff can secure appellate review by seeking
damages instead of, or in addition to, injunctive or mandatory relief. This
is especially desirable where the plaintiff's principal object is to seek a
ruling to govern future conduct, as in the disenfranchisement cases; 153
however, an action for money damages often cannot be combined with an
equity suit, and frequently will not achieve the plaintiff's purpose.
Appeals of criminal convictions present a special problem and should
be heard except where there is genuine acquiescence. The serious extra-
legal as well as the legal consequences of convictions may far outweigh
the damage to the defendant which was caused by satisfaction of the sen-
tence. The decision of these cases should be made by the judiciary,
rather than the executive through pardons, because the judicial branch of
government is best suited to deal with the problems involved in determining
the validity of criminal convictions.
The preferable rule generally is that moot cases should not be decided.
Where overriding considerations of policy exist, the courts should attempt
to set forth the rule of law which they deem controlling, primarily as a
guide for the future conduct of law enforcement bodies and law abiding
citizens. Such decisions may be justified under either the continuing con-
troversy or public interest lines of cases. An example may serve to illus-
trate the value of and the differences between the doctrines. Each year, the
148. Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359 (1921).
149. See notes 100, 101 supra.
150. See text at notes 121-24 supra.
151. Compare Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 154, 214 (1952), wuith Shub v. Simpson,
340 U.S. 861, 881 (1950). See also, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952) (executive order promulgated April 8, Supreme Court decision
rendered June 2). See also Lloyd v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 111 A.2d
379, 382 (Md. Ct. of App. 1954).
152. See text following note 131 supra.
153. See text following note 102 supra.
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Philadelphia City Council has passed a rent control ordinance. In several
cases, these ordinances have been declared unconstitutional by local county
courts.'5 4 Before appellate review of the first of these decisions could be
obtained, however, the ordinance had expired and the case was dismissed
as moot.155 To obtain review under the continuing controversy doctrine,
it would be necessary for the plaintiff to show that the ordinance has been
reenacted or that another ordinance which is substantially the same has
been passed or is about to pass and that this ordinance will affect the par-
ticular person before the court in the moot case. To qualify under a strict
public interest exception, it would be necessary to show that the question
is one of great public importance,' 5 that it is one which will recur fre-
quently, and that it is likely that any case in the future involving the same
question will become moot before final review can be obtained. In this
instance, not only would it probably be easier to meet the requirements of
the continuing controversy doctrine, but that doctrine would, as in most
cases, assure that the purposes of the mootness doctrine would most
nearly be served. Under this doctrine, as compared to the public interest
exception, the issues are more narrow and it is more likely that the par-
ticular plaintiff involved will still have a substantial interest in the outcome
of the litigation.
For a court to make an exception to so fundamental a jurisdictional
rule as the one precluding the decision of moot cases, certain safeguards
should be erected to prevent the dangers against which the rule was de-
signed to guard. Even though sound precedent may arise from a court's
decision in a moot case involving questions of great public importance,
it should always be borne in mind that legislative or executive action can
also accomplish this purpose in many instances,' 7 and that it is to keep
clear the lines of demarcation between the branches of govenment that the
various restrictions on the judicial power were developed and should be
maintained. When such a moot case is decided the courts should take
every precaution to insure that adverse and complete argument, or its
equivalent, is presented.
154. Warren et al. v. Philadelphia, No. 6301, Philadelphia County C.P. No. 5.
June Term, 1953, decided Jan. 29, 1954; Warren et al. v. Philadelphia, No. 7354,
Philadelphia County C.P. No. 5, March Term 1954, decided Dec. 30, 1954; Warren
et al. v. Philadelphia, No. 6327, Philadelphia County C.P. No. 5, Dec. Term, 1954,
decided March 2, 1955.
155. Warren et aL. v. Philadelphia, No. 279, Jan. Term, 1954, Pa. Sup. Ct.,
Oct. 6, 1954. The appeals in the later cases are now pending in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. E.g., Warren et al. v. Philadelphia No. 201, Jan. Term, 1955, Pa.
Sup. Ct.
156. Since the persons opposing the ordinance do not represent the public as a
whole, but merely a portion of the property owners in the City of Philadelphia, and
since the question affects only one municipality in the state, it is doubtful whether
the test of public importance is met in this case. See notes 109, 119, 120 supra.
Pennsylvania cases applying the public interest exception in this area are Maloney
v. United Mine Workers, 308 Pa. 251, 162 Atl. 225 (1935); Pardee v. Schuylkill
County, 276 Pa. 246, 120 Atl. 139 (1923).
157. See Lloyd v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 111 A.2d 379 (Md. Ct.
of App. 1954), where the court refused to decide a moot election case under the
public interest doctrine because the challenged administrative ruling had existed for
six years and the state legislature had not seen fit to change it.
